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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the resilient distributed recovery of large fields
under measurement attacks, by a team of agents, where each mea-
sures a small subset of the components of a large spatially distributed
field. An adversary corrupts some of the measurements. The agents
collaborate to process their measurements, and each is interested in
recovering only a fraction of the field. We present a field recovery
consensus+innovations type distributed algorithm that is resilient to
measurement attacks, where an agent maintains and updates a local
state based on its neighbors states and its own measurement. Un-
der sufficient conditions on the attacker and the connectivity of the
communication network, each agent’s state, even those with compro-
mised measurements, converges to the true value of the field com-
ponents that it is interested in recovering. Finally, we illustrate the
performance of our algorithm through numerical examples.
1. INTRODUCTION
In many applications in the Internet of Things (IoT), device instru-
ment a large environment and measure a spatially distributed field.
For example, a network of roadside units measures traffic patterns
throughout a city [1], and teams of mobile robots collaborate to
map and navigate unknown environments [2]. The devices need
to process their measurements to extract useful information about
the physical field. IoT devices, however, are vulnerable to cyber
attack [3, 4]. Without proper security countermeasures, adversaries
may hijack individual devices, manipulate their measurements, and
prevent them from achieving their computation objectives.
This paper studies the distributed recovery of large physical
fields under measurement attacks. The agents or devices make mea-
surements of the unknown field in their proxomity, and process their
measurements to recover the value of the field. Due to the field’s
large size, no individual agent seeks to recover the entire field. In-
stead, each agent seeks to recover a subset of the field components.
For example, in multi-robot navigation, an individual robot attempts
to recover just its local surroundings instead of mapping the en-
tire environment. The devices are unable to recover their desired
components of the field using just their local measurements; they
share information over a communication network to accomplish
their processing objectives, but an adversary may attempt to thwart
this goal by arbitrarily manipulating a subset of the measurements.
Each agent’s goal is to process its measurement and information
from its network neighbors to recover specific components of the
field without being misled by the adversary.
This material is based upon work supported by the Department of En-
ergy under award number de-oe0000779, by DARPA under agreement num-
bers FA8750-12-2-0291 and HR00111320007, and by the National Science
Foundation under award numbers CCF1513936 and CNS1837607.
We present a consensus+innovations type algorithm [5, 6] for
resilient field recovery. Device maintain and update a local state (an
estimate of the field components of interest) based on the state of its
neighbors in the network and its own measurements. When updating
its state, each device applies an adaptive state dependent gain to its
own measurements to mitigate the effects of potential measurement
attacks. We show that, under sufficient conditions on the compro-
mised measurements and on the connectivity of the communication
network, our algorithm ensures that all of the agents’ local states
converge to the true values of their desired field components.
Prior work in resilient computation has focused on settings
where all devices or agents share a common processing objective.
For example, in resilient consensus, agents attempt to reach agree-
ment on a decision or value in the presence of adversaries [7–9] and
in resilient parameter estimation, agents attempt to recover a com-
mon unknown parameter from local measurements while coping
with malicious data [10–12]. In contrast, in resilient field recovery,
agents have different, heterogeneous processing objectives. This
makes the problem more challenging: when communicating with
neighbors, agents must further process their neighbors’ messages to
extract information relevant to its own objectives.
Existing work has studied field recovery in nonadversarial en-
vironments. In [13], the authors design a procedure to optimally
place sensors in a spatially correlated field. Reference [14] studies
distributed recovery of static fields, and reference [15] designs dis-
tributed Kalman Filters for estimating very large time-varying ran-
dom fields. None of these references, however, address field recov-
ery in adversarial scenarios. In contrast, this paper presents an al-
gorithm for resilient field recovery under measurement attacks. The
rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the mea-
surement and attack models and formalizes the field recovery prob-
lem. We present our resilient distributed field recovery algorithm in
Section 3 and analyze its performance in Section 4. Section 5 illus-
trates the performance of our algorithm through numerical examples,
and we conclude in Section 6.
Notation: Let Rk be the Euclidean space of dimension k, Ik the
k by k identity matrix, and 1k the column vector of k ones. The
j th canonical basis vector of Rk (j = 1, . . . , k) is ej , a column
vector with 1 in the j th element and 0 elsewhere. For symmetric
matrices A = Aᵀ, A  0 (A  0) means that A is positive definite
(semidefinite). For a matrix A, [A]i,j is the element in the ith row
and j th colunm. For a vector v, [v]i is the ith element. A simple
undirected graph G = (V,E) has vertex set V = {1, . . . , N} and
edge set E. Each vertex n has neighborhood Ωn (the set of vertices
that share an edge with vertex n) and degree dn = |Ωn|. The degree
matrix of G is D = diag (d1, . . . , dN ), the adjacency matrix is A,
where [A]n,l = 1 if there is an edge between vertex n and vertex l
and [A]n,l = 0 otherwise, and the Laplacian matrix is L = D − A.
The Laplacian matrix has ordered eigenvalues λ1(L) ≤ λ2(L) ≤
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· · · ≤ λN (L), where λ1(L) = 0. For connected graphs λ2(L) > 0.
References [16, 17] review spectral graph theory.
2. BACKGROUND
Consider N agents or devices measuring an unknown field collected
in the parameter θ∗ ∈ RM . The field parameter θ∗ is high dimen-
sional and spatially distributed over a large physical area; for exam-
ple, in the context of multi-robot navigation, it may represent the
location of obstacles in a large unknown environment. In normal op-
eration conditions (i.e., in the absence of measurement attacks), each
agent’s measurement is
yn = Hnθ
∗. (1)
The measurements may have different dimensions across agents: we
let Pn  M be the dimension of agent n’s measurement (i.e.,
yn(t) ∈ RPn and Hn ∈ RPn×M ). An adversary changes arbi-
trarily manipulates a subset of the measurement values. We model
the effect of the attack with the additive disturbance an:
yn = Hnθ
∗ + an. (2)
In this paper, we focus on distributed field recovery from a single
snapshot of (noiseless) measurements at each agent. The case of
noisy measurement streams (i.e., sequences of measurements over
time yn(0), yn(1), . . . ) is the subject of our ongoing work [18].
We use the convention from [12] for indexing scalar measure-
ment globally across all agents. Let
yt =
[
yᵀ1 · · · yᵀN
]ᵀ
= Hθ∗ + a, (3)
be the vector of all (scalar) measurements at time t, where H =[
Hᵀ1 · · · HᵀN
]ᵀ stacks the measurement matricesH1, . . . , HN ,
and, similarly, a stacks the measurement attacks. The stacked
measurement y has dimension P =
∑N
i=1 Pn. We label the in-
dividual components of y and the rows of H from 1 to P : y =[
y(1) · · · y(P ) ]ᵀ ,H = [ h1 · · · hp ]ᵀ . From the above
indexing convention, we assign the indices Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn,
where Pn =
∑n−1
j=0 Pj , to the individual components of yn, the in-
dividual components of an and rows ofHn (of agent n). We assume
that every row ofH is nonzero and has unit `2-norm, i.e., ‖hp‖2 = 1
for all p = 1. . . . , P . The set A =
{
p ∈ {1, . . . , P} |a(p) 6= 0
}
is
the set of compromised measurements, andN = {1, . . . , P} \ A is
the set of uncompromised measurements. The agents do not know
which measurements are compromised.
The field parameter θ∗ is high dimensional and spatially dis-
tributed over a large physical area, so, each agent’s measurement is
only physically coupled to a few components of θ∗. The measure-
ment matrices Hn capture the physical coupling between the field
θ∗ and the measurements yn(t). We define the physical coupling set
I˜n = {m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} |Hnem 6= 0} , (4)
where em is the mth canonical basis vector of RM , as the indices
of the nonzero columns of the matrix Hn. The set I˜n describes all
components of θ∗ that are physically coupled to the measurement at
agent n.
In distributed field recovery, each agent is interested in recover-
ing a subset of components of θ∗. This contrasts with the setup of
distributed parameter estimation [11, 12], where each agent is inter-
ested in estimating all components of θ∗. In the context of robotic
navigation, for example, each robot may only be interested in esti-
mating its local surroundings instead of the entirety of the (large)
unknown environment. For agent n, its interest set In is the set of
components of θ∗ that it wishes to recover, sorted in ascending or-
der. Following the convention from [14], the expression In (r) = m
means that the rth element of the In (for r = 1, . . . , |In|) is the com-
ponentm (i.e., themth component of θ∗). Conversely, I−1n (m) = r
means that component m is the rth element in In.
We require each agent’s physical coupling set to be a subset of
its interest set, i.e., I˜n ⊆ In, for all n = 1, . . . , N . In addition to
each agent’s interest set, we also define, for each component of θ∗
m = 1, . . . ,M , Jm = {n ∈ {1, . . . , N} |m ∈ In} , the set of all
agents interested in recovering component m. We assume that, for
all m = 1, . . . ,M , the set Jm is nonempty.
Each individual agent may not have enough information from
its local measurements alone to recover all components in its inter-
est set. The agents exchange information over a communication net-
work, modeled as an undirected graphG = (V,E), where the vertex
set V is the set of agents and the edge set E represents communica-
tion links between agents. For each component m = 1, . . . ,M of
the field θ∗, let Gm be the graph induced by all agents interested in
recovering m, i.e., all agents in Jm. We assume that each subnet-
work Gm is connected for all m.
An important concept in field and parameter recovery is global
observability. We assume that the set of all measurements is globally
observable for θ∗: the observability Grammian matrix G = HᵀH =∑P
p=1 hph
ᵀ
p is invertible. Global observability means that, using the
stacked measurement vector yt, it is possible to exactly determine
the value of θ∗. Global observability is required for a fusion center,
which collects and simultaneously processes the measurements of
all of the agents, to recover θ∗, so we assume it here for a fully
distributed setting.
3. RESILIENT DISTRIBUTED FIELD RECOVERY
In this section, we present a distributed field recovery algorithm that
is resilient to measurement attacks.
3.1. Algorithm Description
Each agent nmaintains a |In|-dimensional state xn(t), where the ith
component [xn(t)]i is an estimate of [θ
∗]In(i). Initially, each agent
sets its state as xn(t) = 0 and iteratively updates its state according
to the following procedure.
Step 1 – Communication: Each agent n sends its current state xn(t)
to each of its neighors l ∈ Ωn.
Step 2 –Message Censorship: To account for different interest sets,
each agent processes the states received from it neighbors. First,
each agent n, for each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn, constructs a censored
state xcl,n(t) component-wise as follows:
[
xcl,n(t)
]
i
=
{
[xl(t)]I−1
l
(In(i)) , if In(i) ∈ Il,
0, otherwise,
(5)
for i = 1, . . . , |In|. Second, for each of its neighbors l ∈ Ωn,
agent n also constructs a processed version of its own state, xpl,n(t),
component-wise as follows:
[
xpl,n(t)
]
i
=
{
[xn(t)]i , if In(i) ∈ Il,
0, otherwise. (6)
Step 3 – State Update: Each agent n updates its state following
xn(t+ 1) =xn(t)− βt
∑
l∈Ωn(t)
(
xpl,n(t)− xcl,n(t)
)
+ αtH
c
n
ᵀKn(t) (yn −Hcnxn(t)) ,
(7)
where the matrix Hcn ∈ RPn×|In| is the matrix Hn after remov-
ing all columns whose indices are not in In, Kn(t) is a diago-
nal gain matrix to be defined shortly, and αt and βt are decaying
weight sequences of the form αt = a(t+1)τ1 , βt =
b
(t+1)τ2
. We
select the scalar hyperparmeters a, b, τ1, τ2 to satisfy a, b > 0 and
0 < τ2 < τ1 < 1. The gain matrix Kn(t) is defined as
Kn(t) = diag
(
kPn+1(t), . . . , kPn+Pn(t)
)
, (8)
where, for p = Pn + 1, . . . , Pn + Pn,
kp(t) = min
(
1, γt
∣∣∣y(p) − hcpᵀxn(t)∣∣∣−1) , (9)
hcp
ᵀ is the row vector hᵀp after removing all components not in In,
and γt is a decaying threshold sequence of the form γt = Γ(t+1)τγ .
We select the scalar hyperparameters Γ and τγ to satisfy Γ > 0 and
0 < τγ < τ1 − τ2.
The gain matrix Kn(t) saturates the magnitude of each compo-
nent of its innovation, yn−Hcnxn(t), at the threshold level, γt. The
threshold γt decays over time, which decreases the amount by which
the innovation is able to influence the state update. Intuitively, this
means that, initially, the agents are more willing to trust measure-
ments that differ greatly from their current estimates of the field. As
the agents update their states, they expect their estimates to move
closer to the true values of the field, and they become less willing to
trust measurements that differ greatly from their current estimates.
By decaying the threshold over time, the agents prevent their states
from being led astray by compromised measurements while still in-
corporating enough information from the uncompromised measure-
ments to recover their desired field components.
Compared with algorithms for resilient distributed parameter re-
covery or estimation from [11, 12], the algorithm in this paper intro-
duces the additional message censorship step. This additional step
is required because, unlike parameter recovery or estimation, where
all of the agents are interested in recovering all components of θ∗,
in distributed field recovery, each agent is only interested in recover-
ing a subset of the components of θ∗. Through message censorship,
each agent n extracts information from their neighbors’ states about
only the components of θ∗ it is interested in recovering.
3.2. Main Result: Algorithm Performance
For each agent n, let θ∗In be the |In|-dimensional vector that col-
lects all components of θ∗ in which it is interested in recovering.
We express θ∗In component-wise as
[
θ∗In
]
i
= [θ∗]In(i) for all i =
1, . . . , |In|. The following theorem characterizes the behavior of
the agents’ local states under our resilient distributed field recovery
algorithm.
Theorem 1. Let A = {p1, . . . , p|A|} be the set of compromised
measurements, and letHA =
[
hp1 · · · hp|A|
]ᵀ
be the matrix
that collects all rows of H indexed by elements in A. If the matrix
GN = ∑p∈N hphᵀp satisfies
λmin (GN ) > ∆A, (10)
whereN = P \ A and
∆A = max
v∈R|A|,‖v‖∞≤1
‖HᵀAv‖2 , (11)
then, under the algorithm described in Section 3.1, we have
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)τ0 ‖xn(t)− θ∗In‖2 = 0, (12)
for all agents n and every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ .
Theorem 1 states that, as long as the resilience condition in (10)
is satisfied, the agents’ local states converge to the true values of
the field components they are interested in recovering. The suffi-
cient resilience condition (10) is a condition on the redundancy of
uncompromised measurements and intuitively means that the un-
compromised measurements (across all agents) should collectively
measure θ∗ redundantly enough to overcome the influence of the
compromised measurements. The resilience of our field recovery al-
gorithm depends on the redundancy of the measurements and not on
the agents’ interest sets. In addition to the resilience condition (10),
we also have requirements on the topology of the communication
network G. Recall, from Section 2, that, for each component m =
1, . . . ,M , we require Gm, the subgraph of the communication net-
work G induced by the agents interested in recovering component
m, to be connected.
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the performance of our resilient distributed
field recovery algorithm. Due to space limitations, we outline the
main steps, presented as intermediate results, to prove Theorem 1,
and we provide a detailed analysis in the appendix. The performance
anlaysis follows three main steps. First, we transform each agent’s
state into an auxiliary state. Second, we show that all of the agents’
auxiliary states converges to a generalized network average state. Fi-
nally, we show that the generalized network average state converges
to the true value of the field.
For each agent n, we define the auxiliary state x˜n(t) ∈ RM
(recall that M is the dimension of the field θ∗) component-wise as
[x˜n(t)]i =
{
[xn(t)]I−1n (i) , if i ∈ In,
0, otherwise,
(13)
for each i = 1, . . . ,M . Let x˜t =
[
x˜1(t)
ᵀ · · · x˜N (t)ᵀ
]ᵀ
stack the auxiliary states of all the agents. We may show that x˜t
evolves according to
x˜t+1 = x˜t − βtLx˜t + αtDᵀHKt (y −DH x˜t) , (14)
where Kt = blkdiag (K1(t), . . . ,KN (t)) , DH = blkdiag(H1,
. . . , HN ), and the NM × NM matrix L is defined blockwise as
follows. Let [L]n,l ∈ RM×M be the (n, l)-th sub-block of L, for
n, l = 1, . . . , N , which is defined as
[L]n,l =
{ −Qn∑Ni=1:i 6=n [L]n,iQi, if n = l,
[L]n,lQnQl, otherwise,
(15)
where, for each agent n, the matrixQn is anM×M diagonal matrix
where the mth diagonal element (for m = 1, . . .M ) is 1 if agent n
is interested in recovering [θ∗]m (i.e., m ∈ In) and 0 otherwise.
In (15), the term [L]n,l refers to the (n, l)-th (scalar) element of the
Laplacian L. We now use the auxiliary state update (14) to analyze
the performance of the distribute field recovery algorithm.
Let xt = D (1ᵀN ⊗ IM ) x˜t, where D = diag(|J1|−1 , . . . ,
|JM |−1), be the generalized network average state. Each compo-
nent m = 1, . . . ,M of xt is the average estimate of [θ∗]m taken
over all agents interested in recovering that specific component (i.e.,
all agents n ∈ Jm). Define the matrixQ = blkdiag (Q1, . . . , QN ).
Then, we may show the following result:
Lemma 1. Under the algorithm from section 3.1,
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)τ3 ‖Q (x˜t − (1N ⊗ IM )xt)‖2 = 0, (16)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2.
Lemma 1 states that, under the our algorithm, the auxiliary state of
each agent n = 1, . . . , N , x˜n(t) converges to the generalized net-
work average state xt on all components the interest set In.
We now study the behavior of the generalized network average
state xt. We are interested in et = xt− θ∗, the generalized network
average state error. We may show the following result:
Lemma 2. Under the algorithm from section 3.1, as long as
λmin (GN ) > ∆A, then
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0, (17)
for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ .
Lemma 2 states that, under the resilience condition λmin (GN ) >
∆A (10), the generalized network average state converges to the true
value of the field θ∗.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we provide a proof sketch of Theorem 1.
From the triangle inequality, we have
‖xn(t)− θ∗In‖2 ≤ ‖Qx̂t‖2 + ‖et‖2 . (18)
Then, from Lemmas 1 and 2, under the resilience condition (10), we
have limt→∞ (t+ 1)τ3 ‖Qx̂t‖2 = 0, and limt→∞(t+1)τ0 ‖et‖2 =
0 for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2 and every 0 ≤ τ0 < τγ . Substi-
tuting the above relationships into (18) yields the desired result (12).
5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We consider a mesh network of N = 400 robots agents sensing an
unknown environment, modeled by a two dimensional 230 unit by
230 unit grid. We assign each grid square a [0, 255]-valued state
variable that represents the safety or occupancy of that particular lo-
cation. For example, a state value of 0 may represent a location that
is completely free of obstacles, and a state value of 255 may repre-
sent an impassable obstacle. The field parameter θ∗ is the collection
of the 52, 900 state values from each location. Figure 1 visualizes
the true field: the x and y axis represent location coordinates and
the z axis (θ∗ axis) gives the state value of each (x, y) coordinate
location.
Each agent measures the state values of all locations in a 37×37
unit square subgrid centered at its location and is interested in re-
covering the state values of all locations in a 73 × 73 unit sub-
grid centered at its location. An adversary attacks 45 of the agents
and changes all (scalar) measurements of each agent under attack
to y(p) = 255. We compare the performance of our field recovery
algorithm against the algorithm from [14], CIRFE, which does not
account for measurement attacks, using the following hyperparame-
ters: a = 1, b = 0.084, τ1 = 0.26, τ2 = 0.001,Γ = 40, τγ = 0.25.
Figure 2 shows that the measurement attack induces a persis-
tent local recovery error under CIRFE, while, under our resilient
Fig. 1: A mesh network of 400 agents (left) placed in a 230 × 230
two dimensional grid environment (right). Agents represented by
red diamonds have compromised measurements.
Fig. 2: Evolution of the maximum (across all agents) root mean
square error (RMSE) of recovery, normalized by the square root of
the size of each agent’s interest set.
algorithm, each agent’s recovery error converges to 0 despite the at-
tack. Figure 3 shows the recovery results of our resilient algorithm
and CIRFE after 200 iterations, where, at each location, we report
the worst recovery result (highest RMSE) over all interested agents.
Under our algorithm, all agents resiliently recover the components of
Fig. 3: Recovery results from our algorithm (left) and CIRFE [14]
(right). For each location, we report the worst recovered value (high-
est RMSE) over all interested agents after 200 iterations.
the field in which they are interested, while under CIRFE, the same
measurement attack prevents the agents from accurately recovering
the field.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an algorithm for resilient distributed field
recovery. A network of devices or agents measures a large, spa-
tially distributed field. An adversary compromises a subset of the
measurements, arbitrarily changing their values. Each agent pro-
cesses its (possibly altered) measurements and information from its
neighbors to recover certain components of the field. We presented a
distributed, consensus+innovations type algorithm for resilient field
recovery. As long as there is enough redundancy among the uncom-
promised measurements in measuring the field, then, our algorithm
guarantees that all of the agents’ local states converge to the true
values of the field components that they are interested in recovering.
Finally, we illustrated the performance of our algorithm through nu-
merical examples.
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A. PROOF OF LEMMAS 1 AND 2
We now provide the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2.
A.1. Intermediate Results
We first present intermediate results from [?, 6, 18]. First, the fol-
lowing Lemma from [5] characterizes the behavior of scalar time-
varying systems of the form
wt+1 = (1− r1(t))wt + r2(t), (19)
where r1(t) = c1(t+1)δ1 , r2(t) =
c2
(t+1)δ2
, c1, c2 > 0, and 0 < δ1 <
δ2 < 1.
Lemma 3 (Lemma 5 in [5]). The system in (19) satisfies
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)δ0 wt+1 = 0, (20)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ2 − δ1.
Second, the following result comes as a consequence of Lemma
3 in [12] and studies the convergence of scalar time-varying systems
of the form
wt+1 =
(
1− r1(t)c3
(|wt|+ c5) (t+ 1)δ3
)
wt +
r1(t)c4
(t+ 1)δ4
, (21)
where r1(t) = c1(t+1)δ1 , c3, c4, c5 > 0, and 0 < δ3 < δ4 < δ1.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 3 in [12]). The system in (21) satisfies
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)δ0 wt = 0, (22)
for every 0 ≤ δ0 < δ4 − δ3.
Finally, the following result from Lemma 4.2 in [18] studies per-
turbations to positive definite matrices:
Lemma 5. Let A1  0 (A1 ∈ Rk×k) be a symmetric, positive
definite matrix with minimum eigenvalue λmin (A1). Let x 6= 0,
x ∈ Rk, and let y ∈ Rk satisfy ‖y‖2 < λmin (A1) ‖x‖2 . Then
there exists A2  0 such that
A2x = A1x+ y, (23)
with a minimum eigenvalue that satisfies
λmin (A2) ≥ λmin (A1)− ‖y‖2‖x‖2
. (24)
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let
x̂t = x˜t − (1N ⊗ IM )xt, (25)
stack x˜n(t) − xt across all agents. For each component m =
1, . . . ,M , let
Jm =
{
nm,1, . . . , nm,|Jm|
}
be the set of agents interested in recovering [θ∗]m. Then, for each
agent n ∈ Jm, the canonical basis vector eᵀ(n−1)M+m (of RNM )
selects agent n’s estimate of [θ∗]m from x˜t:
eᵀ(n−1)M+mx˜t = [x˜n(t)]m .
We collect all such canonical basis row vectors for every agent n ∈
Jm in the matrix
Qm =
[
e(nm,1−1)M+m · · · e(nm,|Jm|−1)M+m
]ᵀ
. (26)
Then, the |Jm|-dimensional vector x̂mt = Qmx̂t, collects the terms
x̂n(t)−xt from all agents n interested in recovering component m.
From (14), we may show that x̂mt follows the dynamics
x̂mt+1 =
(
I|JM | − P|JM |,1 − βtLm
)
x̂mt +
αtQm (INM − (1N1ᵀN )⊗D)DᵀHKt (y −DH x˜t) ,
(27)
where P|Jm|,1 =
1
|Jm|1|Jm|1
ᵀ
|Jm| and Lm is the Laplacian of Gm
(the subgraph of G induced by the agents in Jm). Since Gm is con-
nected, and, by definition of Kt, we have ‖Kt (yt −Dhx˜t)‖∞ ≤
γt, which means that there exists a finite constant C1 > 0 such that
C1γt≥‖Qm (INM−(1N1ᵀN )⊗D)DᵀHKt (y −DH x˜t)‖2 . (28)
Then, for t large enough, we have
‖x̂mt+1‖2 ≤ (1− βtλ2 (Lm)) ‖x̂mt ‖2 + C1αtγt. (29)
Since Gm is connected (λ2 (Lm) > 0), the relationship in (29) falls
under the purview of Lemma 3, which yields
lim
t→∞
(t+ 1)τ3 ‖x̂mt ‖2 = 0, (30)
for every 0 ≤ τ3 < τγ + τ1 − τ2 and every component m =
1, . . . ,M . Let Q be the matrix Q with all zero rows removed, and
note thatQx̂t is a permutation of the vector
[
x̂1ᵀt · · · x̂Mᵀt
]ᵀ
.
By the triangle inequality, we have
‖Qx̂t‖2 =
∥∥Qx̂t∥∥2 ≤ M∑
m=1
‖x̂mt ‖2 ,
which, combined with (30), yields the desired result (16).
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
To we prove Lemma 2, we require the following result.
Lemma 6. Let the auxiliary threshold γt be defined as
γt =
Γ
(t+ 1)τγ
− X
(t+ 1)τ3
, (31)
where τ3 = τγ+τ1−τ2−X for arbitrarily small 0 < X < τ1−τ2,
and, recall, γt = Γ(t+1)τγ . As long as λmin (GN ) > ∆A (resilience
condition (10)), then there exists T0 ≥ 0, and 0 < X < ∞ such
that
1. ‖Qx̂t‖2 ≤ X(t+1)τ3 , and
2. if, for any T ≥ T0, ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT , then, for all t ≥ T ,‖et‖2 ≤ γt.
Proof of Lemma 6. As a consequence of (16), from Lemma 1, there
exists finite X such that ‖Qx̂t‖2 ≤ X(t+1)τ3 . What remains is to
show that the second condition holds.
We now derive the dynamics of et. Recall that
xt = D (1ᵀN ⊗ IM ) x˜t
and
et = xt − θ∗.
From the dynamics of x˜t (equation (14)), we have that xt evolves
according to
xt+1 = xt + αtD (1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKt (y −DH x˜t) . (32)
Note that, since τ3 > τγ , for t large enough, γt > 0. Recall that, for
each agent n, the matrixQn is anM×M diagonal matrix where, the
mth diagonal element (form = 1, . . .M ) is 1 if agent n is interested
in recovering [θ∗]m (i.e., m ∈ In) and 0 otherwise. Further recall
that, for each n, I˜n ⊆ In. Since I˜n is the set of indices of the
nonzero columns ofHn, by definition ofQn, we haveHnQn = Hn
for each agent n, which means that DHQ = DH . Then, we may
express DH x˜t as
DH x˜t = DH (1N ⊗ IM ) x˜t +DHQx̂t, (33)
where, recall, from (25), x̂t = x˜t − (1N ⊗ IM )xt.
Define
KNt = diag
(
k˜1(t), . . . , k˜p(t)
)
, (34)
KAt = Kt −KNt . (35)
Substituting (33) into (32) and performing algebraic manipulations,
we may show that et follows the dynamics
et+1 =
(
IM − αtD
∑
p∈N
kp(t)hph
ᵀ
p
)
et−
αtD
(
(1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKNt (DHQx̂t) + bt
)
,
(36)
where bt = (1ᵀN ⊗ IM )DᵀHKAt (y −DH x˜t) captures the effect
of the attack. Using the definition of ∆A in (11) and the fact that∥∥KAt (y −DH x˜t)∥∥∞ ≤ γt, we have that
‖bt‖2 ≤ ∆Aγt = ∆A
(
γt +X(t+ 1)
−τ3) . (37)
Then, we express bt as
bt = bt + b˜t, (38)
where
∥∥∥b˜t∥∥∥
2
≤ ∆A (X(t+ 1)τ3) and
∥∥bt∥∥2 ≤ ∆Aγt.
Now, we study the evolution of ‖et‖2. We show that, for T0
large enough, if, for some T ≥ T0, ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT , ten, for all t ≥ t,‖et‖2 ≤ γt. Applying the triangle inequality to the noncompro-
mised measurements p ∈ N , we have∣∣∣y(p) − hcpᵀxn(T )∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣hᵀp (Qn (xT − xn(T ))− eT )∣∣ , (39)
≤ ‖eT ‖2 + ‖Qx̂T ‖2 , (40)
≤ γt +
X
(T + 1)τ3
= γt. (41)
That is, kp(T ) = 1, for all uncompromised measurements p ∈ N .
From (36), we then have
eT+1 = eT − αTD
(
GNeT + bT + b˜T
)
−
αTD (1N ⊗ IM )DᵀHKNT DHQx˜T ,
(42)
where GN = ∑p∈N hphᵀp. Since ∆A ≤ |A| and |A| + |N | = P ,
we have
‖eT+1‖2 ≤
∥∥(IM − αTDGN ) eT + αTDbT∥∥2 +
αTPX
J(T + 1)τ3
,
(43)
where J = minm=1,...,M |Jm| .
Since ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT , there exists e∗T with ‖eT ‖2 = γT , such
that
‖eT+1‖2 ≤
∥∥(IM − αTDGN ) e∗T + αTDbT∥∥2 +
αTPX
J(T + 1)τ3
.
(44)
By Lemma 5, there exists G∗T  0 such that G∗T e∗T = GNe∗T + bT ,
with minimum eigenvalue
λmin
(G∗T,ω) ≥ κ = λmin (GN )−∆A. (45)
Substituting in (44), we then have, for some finite C2 > 0.
‖eT+1‖2 ≤ (1− αTκC2) γT,ω +
αTPX
J(T + 1)τ3
. (46)
Using (46), we now show that ‖eT+1‖2 ≤ γT+1. It suffices
to show that ‖eT+1‖2 ≤
(
T+1
T+2
)τγ
γT . By definition of γT , for
any 0 < Γ < Γ, there exists a sufficiently large finite T such that
γt >
Γ
(t+1)τγ
. As a consequence, we may show that, for sufficiently
large finite T , (46) becomes
‖eT+1‖2 ≤ (1− αT ρT ) γT , (47)
where
ρT = κC2 − PX
JΓ(T + 1)τ3−τγ
. (48)
The second term in ρT decays to 0 as T increases, so, for sufficiently
large T , ρT ≥ 0.
To proceed, we show that
1− αT ρT ≤
(
T + 1
T + 2
)τγ
(49)
for sufficiently large T . Using the inequalities (1 − x) ≤ e−x for
x ≥ 0 and log
(
T+1
T+2
)
≥ 1− T+2
T+1
= − 1
T+1
, a sufficient condition
for (49) is
αT ρT ≥ τγ
T + 1
. (50)
In the definition of ρT (48), the second term decays to 0 as T in-
creases, which means that, for any constant 0 < ρ < κC2, there
exists sufficiently large finite T such that ρT > ρ. Then, the suffi-
cient condition (50) becomes
αT ρ ≥ τγ
T + 1
, (51)
which is satisfied for all T ≥
(
τγ
aρ
) 1
1−τ1 − 1. Thus, there exists
T0 sufficiently large such that, if ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT for some T ≥ T0,
we have ‖eT+1‖2 ≤ γT+1. The same analysis holds for all t =
T + 2, T + 3, . . . , which completes the proof.
We now prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. As a consequence of Lemma 6, there exists
T0 ≥ 0 such that, if at any T ≥ T0, ‖eT ‖2 ≤ γT , then,
for all t ≥ T , ‖et‖2 ≤ γt. If such a T exists, then we have‖et‖2 ≤ γt < γt, which means that et satisfies (17).
If no such T exists, then, for all t ≥ T0, ‖et‖2 > γt. Define
K̂t =
γt +
X
(t+1)τ3
‖et‖2 + X(t+1)τ3
. (52)
Using the fact that ‖Qx̂t‖2 ≤ X(t+1)τ3 and applying the triangle
inequality, we may show that K̂t < kp(t) for all p ∈ N . Rearrang-
ing (52), we have
γt = K̂t
(
‖et‖2 +
X
(t+ 1)τ3
)
. (53)
Recall that, in the dynamics of et (36), the vector
bt = (1
ᵀ
N ⊗ IM )DᵀHKAt (y −DH x˜t)
represents the effect of the attack and satisfies ‖bt‖2 ≤ ∆Aγt.
Using (53), we then partition bt (differently from the partition de-
scribed by (38)) as bt = bt + b˜t, where
∥∥bt∥∥2 ≤ K̂t∆A ‖et‖2
and
∥∥∥b˜t∥∥∥
2
≤ K̂t∆AX
(t+1)τ3
.
Substituting for this partition of bt and using the fact that K̂t >
kp(t) for all p ∈ N , we may show, from (36), that
‖et+1‖2 ≤
∥∥∥(IM − αtK̂tDGN) et,ω + αtDbt∥∥∥
2
+
αtPX
J(t+ 1)τ3
.
(54)
As a consequence of Lemma 5, there exists G∗t  0 such that G∗t et =
K̂tGNet+bt with a minimum eigenvalue that satisfies λmin (G∗t ) ≥
K̂tκ, where κ = λmin (GN ) − ∆A (see (45)). Substituting for G∗t
into (54) and performing algebraic manipulations, we have, for finite
C2 > 0
‖et+1‖2 ≤
(
1− αtK̂tC3κ
)
‖et‖2 +
αtPX
J(t+ 1)τ3
. (55)
Using the fact that K̂t > Γ
(
(t+ 1)τγ
(‖et‖2 +X))−1, the re-
lation in (54) falls under the purview of Lemma 4, and we have
limt→∞ (t+ 1)
τ0 ‖et‖2 = 0, for every 0 ≤ τ0 < τ3 − τγ =
τ1 − τ2 − X . Taking X arbitrarily close to 0 yields the desired
result (17) and completes the proof.
